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6
Perception as a Function of Desire
in the Renaissance
De amore, or the Commentary on Plato’s Symposium, was written in 1469,
after Marsilio Ficino had finished translating the works of Plato for the Medici family. It was not published until 1484, when it was included with Ficino’s translations of Plato’s works from Greek to Latin. Ficino’s definition of
beauty follows the Platonic definition as depending on a universal principle,
that is, as given by language. According to Ficino, that which pleases the
soul must be an incorporeal beauty, a conceptual representation not based in
sense perception. In De amore, II.9, “beauty of the soul also is a splendor in
the harmony of doctrines and customs,”1 in the matrix of language which
creates the identity of the subject in terms other than sense perception. Desire
in De amore is not a physical, instinctual desire, but a desire created by language in the construction of perception. In II.2, “For it is the same God
whose beauty all things desire, and in possessing whom all things rest. From
there, therefore, our desire is kindled.” Desire is governed by knowledge of
God, knowledge of the archetypal principle in language. Perception, and
judgments of beauty, are governed by the desire which is a function of language. Perception and desire are constructed through language. The desire
for the good in the circuitus spiritualis through the hypostases is that which
governs artistic expression.
The hypostases are described in the first speech in De amore, made by
Giovanni Calvalcanti, a friend of Ficino’s, to explain the speech made by
Phaedrus in the Symposium of Plato. The hypostases are the Angelic Mind,
the World Soul, from Plato, and the World Body. God himself is not accessible to the hypostases, as He is infinitely simple, and not of the world, which
is necessarily multiple, and ornamental, that is, a product of perception. Both
the ornamental machine of the world and the ideas behind the machine are
created by the inaccessible God, just as the archetypal forms are created by
the children of the demiurge in the Timaeus. The inaccessibility and infinite
simplicity of the origin are qualities of the One of Plotinus. The world prior
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to the creation of forms is chaos, formless and dark. Chaos turns to order
through the creation of the substance of the mind, the archetypal idea, which
is its essence. The essence, which is itself formless and dark, is imbued with
a desire to “turn towards God,” as it is born from God. The essence of mind,
the archetypal idea, is in Plotinus the Intellectual, that part of mind which
understands the intelligibles, and in which the divine idea participates.
Sensible objects have no connection with each other, or with the perceiving subject. Without the ordering process of reason and perception, of which
language is a function, the sensible world would not exist. Desire for God, or
order, is a desire for human reason in relation to the sensible world, a validation of human thought in relation to the sensible world. “Turned toward
God,” Calvalcanti says, the essence of mind, or the Intellectual Principle, “is
illuminated by His ray,” and the appetite or desire of the intellectual is increased by the splendor of the ray. As the intellectual reaches toward God in
its desire, “it receives form. For god, who is omnipotent, imprints on the
Mind, reaching out towards Him, the nature of all things which are to be created.” In perception, the mind creates the form of all things perceived prior to
the actual perception, prior to the making of the imprint of the sensible object
in the eye. The imprint is determined a priori by reason, not in conscious
reasoning, but in the essence of mind, which is the intellectual of Plotinus.
The concept that the form of the imprint of the sensible object is determined
prior to the perception of the object can be found in the writings of Plotinus.
In De amore, everything which is perceived is painted on the Angelic
Mind, from which are created the forms of all sensible objects, the spheres
and the vapors, like the archetypal forms which are created by the children of
the demiurge of Plato. The forms of things are conceived in the celestial
mind, and are called the Ideas, as they are in the Timaeus. The form of each
type of sensible object is given a mythological character, to reinforce the fact
that the forms are products of the celestial mind, that they determine perception of the sensible world, rather than being determined by it. The form or
idea of the heavens, or the sphere of the fixed stars, is Uranus. The forms of
the first two planets are Saturn and Jupiter. The form of fire is Vulcan, the
form of air is Juno, the form of water is Neptune, and the form of earth is
Pluto. Without the ordering of the sensible world by reason in perception, the
world would only appear as disconnected chaos. Such perception is a function of the desire created in mind by reason itself for the operation of the
human being in the sensible world, which depends on its ordering by reason,

John Hendrix

101

but in a process which is inaccessible to reason itself, which escapes the selfconsciousness of reason, and is thus a function of the essence or intellectual.
The first turning of the essence of mind to God from chaos is the birth of
love, the infusion of the illuminating ray of God is the nourishment of love,
and the forming of the ideas is the perfection of love. The forms and ideas of
the intellect form a mundus or cosmos, which is the ornament, and the grace
of the ornament is beauty. That which is most beautiful in the sensible world
is that which most conforms to the forms and ideas in intellect, as the form
and idea interact with the imprint of the sensible object in perception. Love
attracts the mind to the beautiful, and allows the mind to become beautiful,
as it becomes more aware of the divine idea. The beauty of the ideas in the
mind corresponds to the beauty of sensible objects, because it is the ideas in
the mind which form sensible objects. Thus “the mind is turned toward God
in the same way that the eye is directed toward the light of the sun,” in which
it perceives the colors and shapes of things, which are formed from the inner
light, which is the basis of the imagination.
As the mind looks toward the illumination of the divine idea, “it is informed with the colors and shapes of things,” to which the sensible world
conforms in the process of perception. Perception is a mechanism of the desire of the divine idea, the intelligibles, which order the sensible world, and
allow it in turn to be loved by the perceiver. One loves to look at nature because one loves the way that it conforms to their idea of the order of the
world, as in mathematics and geometry. One loves the sensible world because it reinforces intellect, and the inaccessible source of the generation of
ideas within it. The World Soul, the structure of the cosmos, turns toward the
same ideas, from formlessness and chaos, and its turning is caused by love
also. The world around the subject desires what the subject desires. The
world becomes a world when it has received the forms from the mind, that is,
when it is perceived. Without love, without the subject being present to perceive it, the world would just be formless matter, disconnected and haphazard. But love is innate in it, and it turns toward order.
Love is the desire for beauty in De amore I.4, for “this is the definition of
love among all philosophers.” Beauty is a three-fold grace which originates
in harmonies: the harmony of virtues in souls, the harmony of colors and
lines in bodies, and the harmony of tones in music. Harmony in soul is
known by intellect, harmony in body is known by visual perception, and
harmony in sound is known by aural perception. It is through the intellect
and perception that love is satisfied, as opposed to through bodily functions.
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The harmony in intellect corresponds to the harmony in vision and sound.
The visual form of a work of art corresponds to the form of the ideas in the
mind, and is thus considered beautiful, and incites desire, for beauty in form
and virtue in mind. The work of art is successful if it incites that desire, the
desire for God, and never satiates that desire, as desire for the infinite and inaccessible can never be satiated. Thus the viewer would always have the desire to return to the work of art, and see it again, because it conforms to the
desire of the intellect for the good, or the idea of forms which orders the
world in perception, and language as well, as a function of perception.
The “beauty of the human body requires a harmony of different parts” in
the same way that perception requires a harmony of forms and colors and
language requires a harmony of words in a syntax. The harmony of the different parts of the body is itself a syntax. The form of each sensible object in
perception which is shaped by the idea in the imprint is seen as a sign, or a
signifier, as in language. To the signifier as form corresponds an idea, in the
intellectual, as signified, just as an idea corresponds to a word in language.
The sign in perception, a head or leg in a body, for example, corresponds to
an idea of the head or leg in the intellectual. The harmony of the parts of the
body is not given by the body, but by perception and intellect, as a function
of desire; without the perceiver, the body is a chaotic, disconnected, arbitrary
assemblage of parts, which in the Renaissance would be defined as the ugly.
Love, and desire, are functions of the graces, in intellectual, visual, and
aural harmony. The “appetite which follows the other senses is not called
love, but lust or madness.” Love between two people is a mutual desire for
beauty, a reciprocal understanding of what beauty is, in both body and intellect. In De amore II.9, love of the body is only in the visual perception of the
body, in the beauty of the “splendor itself in the ornament of colors and
lines.” The “desire to touch is not part of love…but rather a kind of lust and
perturbation of a man who is servile.” Love in intellect is a mutual desire for
those laws and customs which are seen as harmonious and beautiful. “Beauty
of the soul also is a splendor in the harmony of doctrines and customs.” Platonic love, the idea of Ficino and not Plato, is the reciprocal desire for beauty
in soul, the shared love of God.
When “we are attracted to a certain man as part of the world order,” as
Carlo Marsuppini, a student of Ficino, suggests in the fifth speech of the
Commentary on the Symposium, we find the person beautiful in so far as they
conform, either physically or intellectually, to our idea of beauty as it exists
in and is defined by the matrix of laws and customs in which we operate, that
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is, the ornament of the world, the cosmos. In V.5, we are attracted to that certain person “especially when the spark of the divine beauty shines brightly in
him,” that is, his form corresponds to the light in our imagination. We find a
person beautiful when “the appearance and figure of a well-constructed man
correspond most closely with that Reason of Mankind which our soul received from the author of all things and still retains.” Beauty is in the eye of
the beholder, and beauty is culturally conditioned.
As the beauty of a sensible object depends on its correspondence with the
form of the imprint in perception as determined by the idea, “it happens that
the external form of a thing, striking with its image the Form of the same
thing depicted in the soul, either disagrees or agrees with it…” Whether the
sensible object agrees with the form of the imprint or not depends on “a certain natural and hidden incongruity or congruity,” and then “moved by this
hidden opposition or attraction, the soul either hates or loves the thing itself.”
The hidden quality is that part of mind which is not accessible to discursive
reason, the active intellect of Aristotle, or the Intellectual Principle of Plotinus. The intellectual is the higher part of mind which is able to understand
intelligibles, ideas in forms which are not apparent to logic or conscious reason. Marsuppini paraphrases Enneads I.6.2 and V.3.3 of Plotinus.
At the end of his speech Marsuppini asks, if “anyone asked in what way
the form of the body can be like the Form and Reason of the Soul and Mind,
let him consider…the building of the architect.” The harmony of proportions
of the work of art corresponds to the harmony of proportions in music, and
the harmony of proportions in mathematics and geometry, instruments of the
explicatum or unfolding of the intelligibles in intellect into the forms of discursive reason, as elaborated by Nicolas Cusanus. The analogy of the building of the architect, taken from the tenth book of the Republic and the sixth
tractate of the first book of the Enneads, illustrates the correspondence between the architecture of the building and the architectonic, the transcendental idea, of the architect. The architectonic is the ornament or structure of the
cosmos, as in the geometrical solids molded by the children of the demiurge
in the Timaeus. The transcendental idea is the idea which pre-exists perception, the concepts which order the sensible world but do not exist in it, and
all the proportional relations derived from them in mathematics and geometry in discursive reason.
The design of the building is the form of the sensible object which corresponds to the idea of the architect. All forms in architecture and art are necessarily ideas pre-existent in the mind of the architect or artist, even if they
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are arrived at by chance. The architecture of the building exists completely
independently of its matter; architecture requires no matter at all, as it is the
form of the architectonic. “Therefore go ahead,” Marsuppini says, “subtract
its matter if you can (and you can subtract it mentally), but leave the design.
Nothing of body, nothing of matter will remain to you.” The form of the art
or architecture is identical to the idea in the mind, in the process of the imagination which is the Vorstellung, picture thinking, which is ordered in language, as well as mathematics and geometry. In the Vorstellung, pictures are
transformed into words as they become mnemic residues. The mnemic residue of the imprint becomes the word in language as the spirit of the divine
becomes the logos, and the order of the syntax of the language, of words or
forms, corresponds to the order of the idea.
In the seventh speech, by Tommaso Benci, the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz,
the representation of the representation in perception, is explained. The medium by which the forms of the ideas are transferred to the imprints of sensible objects is the spirit. In VI.6, images of external bodies “cannot be
imprinted directly on the soul because incorporeal substance…cannot be
formed by them through the receiving of images.” Images cannot be immediately or directly perceived; there must be an intermediary which translates
the images in perception, as Plotinus held. The soul, though, “easily sees the
images of bodies shining in it, as if in a mirror.” The image can only be a reflection or representation of the idea, the image in the soul or intellect. The
intellect, through the medium of the spirit, corresponds the form of the idea
with the form of the imprint or impression of the sensible body, and this operation is called the imagination. Imagination consists of the formation of
images in intellect which are representations of imprints in perception which
are representations, determined by intellect, of sensible objects. Such images
of the imagination retained in intellect constitute memory, and generate
words, from the mnemic residues, in picture-thinking. The linguistic correspondent of the representation of the image facilitates the memory of it.
This process is generated by the desire or appetite of the intellect, the essence of mind, for the ideas, and it is perpetuated by desire generated by the
gaps created between the perceiving subject and on the one hand the inaccessible source of the generation of ideas, and on the other hand the sensible
world. The eye of the soul is “aroused to contemplate the universal ideas of
things which it contains in itself,” and at the same time “the soul is perceiving a certain man in sensation, and conceiving him in the imagination…” In
both parts of this dual operation, desire is generated and perpetuated. While
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the soul, or lower intellect, or discursive reason, can preserve an image in
memory, in the retention of the mnemic residues, or imprints, the eye in perception and the medium of spirit, as physical operations, “can receive images
of a body only in its presence,” and can only reflect it, like a mirror. Once the
image is not present, it is lost. It can only be retained, and transformed in the
imagination, through the operations of intellect. The soul, or discursive reason, is dominated by the eye and spirit, and also requires the presence of the
image, and thus can only reflect it as a mirror. Intellect, the essence of mind,
is required for imagination. The desire for the sensible object outside of visual perception is found in discursive reason as well as sensual experience; the
desire for the sensible object as a form of the idea again requires intellect and
imagination. The sensual desire is created by the gap between the object as a
relation in a syntax, as given by logic, and the object as the form of an idea,
as given by intellect, as well as the gap between the perceiving subject in
discursive reason and the sensible object.
Tommaso Benci sums up the theses of the Commentary. In VI.8, the
form of a body, the shape of a sensible object, is received by the eye, and by
penetrating the spirit, corresponds to the figure of the idea of the body which
is contained in divine intellect. The correspondence “pleases the soul,” producing the grace of love which is beauty, because it “corresponds to those
Reasons which both our intellect and our power of procreation preserve as
copies of the thing itself,” the power of procreation being the imagination,
the reasons being the linguistic equivalent of the figure in the picture thinking, the basis of memory. In perception, an imprint of a figure is received by
the eye, and it is matched to a figure in the imagination, and transferred to
reason in language, and through the intervention of divine intellect, the figure
is understood in relation to the architectonic of the cosmos, which results in
beauty and love.
In VI.13, all things are understood by the light of the divine intellect,
“but the pure light itself and its source we cannot see in this life,” as it is that
part of soul or intellect which is inaccessible. Intellect “can turn to this light
whenever it wishes,” through “purity of life and intense concentration of desire,” and in so doing “it shines with the sparks of the Ideas.” Accessing the
essence of mind, divine intellect, in reason requires effort, and each individual is free to either make the effort, or to live a life among shadows, being
manipulated in thought by sensual forms and sensual desires.
Cristoforo Marsuppini, another student of Ficino, further summarizes the
Commentary in the seventh speech. In VII.1, memory in intellect is described
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as a mirror which reflects an image of the figure of a sensible object like a
ray of light through the eyes, so that another image is formed, as if a piece of
wool next to the mirror might be set on fire by the light reflected by the mirror, and the blazing wool would be an image of the sun. The image of the
blazing wool in the imagination is a splendor of the first image, “by which
the force of desire is kindled and loves,” as perception is a function of desire.
In the summation of Marsuppini, “love, kindled in the appetite of sense,
is created by the form of the body seen through the eyes,” as perception is a
function of desire, but in perception or imagination the form of the body is
without matter. The lack of the matter of the form of the body in vision creates desire, the desire caused by lack, in the disjunction between form and
matter. When the figure of the form of the body in the imagination is transformed to or made to correspond to the figure of the form of the archetype in
intellect, it is transformed from a particular form to a universal idea in a process of abstraction. Thus “there immediately appears in the intellect another
species of this image, which no longer seems to be a likeness of one particular human body, as it was in the fancy, but a common Reason or definition of
the whole human race equally.” The particular form becomes an instrument
in reason by which a universal abstraction is made, as in the Symposium, by
which an idea is formed which orders experience.
As Plato divided beauty into the terrestrial and celestial, venere vulgare
and venere celeste, as illustrated in the Birth of Venus of Alessandro Botticelli, so love is divided by Marsuppini into bodily love and intellectual love. A
“love inclined toward the senses” resides in “the appetite of sense devoted to
the body,” while “another love which is very foreign to commerce with the
body” resides in or arises from “intellect’s universal species or Reason.” As
sensible objects can only be given as representations in intellect, so the love
which resides in the senses can only be given by the love which resides in
intellect, and can only be seen as false, without essence, as are objects outside of perception.
Perspectival Construction
The premise of perspectival construction is that the real world is not immediately perceived, that it is given to us through the intermediary of geometry
and mathematics, that vision is a conceptual process. Perspective in painting
reproduces the world as geometrically constructed. A scene constructed with
perspective appears more real or natural to us precisely because it is not real
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or natural, because our perception of the world around us does not correspond to the world as it actually exists. This is the thesis of Immanuel Kant,
and it is also a basis for the theory of perception of Plotinus. The Enneads of
Plotinus were translated into Latin by Marsilio Ficino in the Renaissance.
Although there is no reference to Plotinus’ theory of perception in the major
treatises on perspectival construction written during the Renaissance—that
is, the De pictura of Leon Battista Alberti or the De prospectiva pingendi,
On Perspective in Painting, of Piero della Francesca—Plotinus’ development
of Plato’s theory of vision is present in the theoretical basis of Renaissance
perspective. References to Plato by Alberti and Piero form the basis of the
Neoplatonic element of Renaissance artistic theory. But Ficino did not begin
the translation of Plotinus until 1484, fifty years after Alberti’s treatise and
ten years after Piero’s treatise.
Perspectival construction, or costruzione legittima, was seen as both a
model of vision and a geometrical allegory of Neoplatonic emanation, in Leon Battista Alberti’s De pictura and Piero della Francesca’s De prospectiva
pingendi. In the De prospectiva pingendi, perspectival construction is a form
of commensuratio in painting, or proportion, based on the progression from
point to line to surface to body. Such a progression serves as a model for the
unfolding or explicatum of the material world, as can be found in the Timaeus, Euclid’s Elements of Geometry, and Proclus’ Commentary on the First
Book of Euclid’s Elements, all available from medieval translations. The geometric progression corresponds to Piero’s pyramid of vision, following the
theory of vision of Alberti in De pictura, and corresponding to Ficino’s model in the Theologia Platonica of 1482.
Of the three parts of painting, Piero declared at the beginning of De prospectiva pingendi, only commensuratio would be discussed, or perspective,
but “mixing in parts of disegno, without which it is impossible to demonstrate perspective.”2 Color would be left out, but the parts of painting would
be discussed “that can be demonstrated with angled lines and proportions,
that is, the points, lines, surfaces and bodies.”3 These classifications correspond to the definitions of Euclid’s Elements of Geometry. Piero identified
five elements that need to be considered in the perspectival construction of a
painting: sight, or the eye; the form of the thing seen; the distance from the
eye to the thing seen; the lines that connect the eye to the extremities or bordering lines of the thing seen; and the area between the eye and the thing
seen.4 These five elements need to be understood in order to understand perspectival construction.
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The eye is defined as that in which are represented all of the things seen
under different angles. Objects appear as images in the eye depending on the
angle of projection of the lines from the extremities of the objects to the eye;
the larger the angle, the closer and larger the object. Objects in space occupy
a hierarchy of being, or value, given by the variation in the relation to the angle of projection. This is stated in the Eighth Theorem of Euclid’s Optica.5
Sensible things, or objects in the sensible world, are therefore abstracted
and transformed into images in the eye through geometry. The images in the
eye exist as copies of the sensible objects, and the objects become intelligible
in the mind’s eye, or objects of the intellect. This is a core idea in the Enneads of Plotinus. In the Enneads V.5.7, “actual seeing is double; take the eye
as an example, for it has one object of sight which is the form of the object
perceived by the sense, and one which is the medium through which the form
of its object is perceived, which is also itself perceptible to the eye; it is different from the form, but is the cause of the form’s being seen…”6 The forms
and proportions of sensible things are constructed in the mind, from the idea
of the things, or the intelligibles, which are translated to the sensible world
through mathematics and geometry, by way of perspectival construction as it
plays a role in vision. It is the form of the thing, according to Piero della
Francesca, rather than the thing itself, without which the intellect cannot
judge nor can the eye comprehend the thing. For Plotinus, in III.6.1, “sense
perceptions are not affections but activities and judgments concerned with
affections…” Things in the real world cannot be received immediately
through sense perception as themselves, because sense perception itself is a
cognitive process. In the twentieth century, David Layzer writes, in Cosmogenesis: the growth of order in the universe, “Human visual perception is a
cyclical process in which the brain constructs, tests, and modifies perceptual
hypotheses. In order to have a percept, we must construct it.”7
Leon Battista Alberti, in his treatise on painting written in 1435, De pictura, which has many similarities to Piero’s De prospectiva pingendi, constructed a theory of vision in which rays of light are arranged in a pyramid.
Surfaces are defined and measured by rays of light which serve to translate
visual matter into intelligible matter, giving it the qualities of proportion and
arrangement, as for Piero. Certain rays of light, which Alberti called “extrinsic rays,” define the outline, measure and dimension of surfaces. The extrinsic rays define the outline of the pyramid of light in vision. The pyramid is
formed between the surface of the matter and the eye, which is the source of
an inner light. As Alberti explained, “The base of the pyramid is the surface
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seen, and the sides are the visual rays we said are called extrinsic. The vertex
of the pyramid resides within the eye, where the angles of the quantities in
the various triangles meet together” (I.7).8 Extrinsic rays of light measure
quantity, which is “the space across the surface between two different
points” (I.6), defined by geometry.
Contained within the pyramid of light, and enclosed by the extrinsic rays,
are another type of ray, which is called the “median ray.” Median rays,
which are weaker than extrinsic rays, are not strong enough to define outlines
and measurements, but instead are variable and absorb light and color to varying degrees. They extend between the vertex of the pyramid and the surface
of the matter, and fill in the color and shadow found within the outline of the
matter. Among the median rays, one in the center of the pyramid stands out
among them as the strongest, which is the “centric ray,” which corresponds
to the vanishing point of perspectival construction. The centric ray forms a
direct line from the vertex of the pyramid to the center of the surface, exactly
perpendicular to the surface. The position of the centric ray, along with the
distance of the ray from the vertex, determines the disposition of the outline
of the surface. The location of the centric ray determines the position of the
outline.
Following Alberti, in De prospectiva pingendi, Piero described the extrinsic rays in the pyramid of vision as lines which present themselves from
the extremities of the thing and end up in the eye, in between which the eye
receives and discerns them. Piero described the border of the object which is
described by the rays of the eye in proportion and measure. It is the border of
the thing, established through measure and proportion by the extrinsic rays
from the eye, that determines how things diminish in size in relation to the
eye, corresponding to the sharpness of the angle in vision. Thus it is necessary to understand the linear qualities of objects in a picture plane so that
they can be represented, in their ideal beauty, as copies of the patterns of intelligible objects.
Following the definition of the elements of the painting, Piero proceeded
in the treatise to discuss the elements of commensuratio, or perspective, in
particular, in the first book: points, lines, and plane surfaces. The point is defined as that which has no parts, something which is imaginative, according
to geometers, a thing which is as small as the eye can comprehend, and that
which does not contain quantity. This follows the definition of the point in
Euclid’s Elements of Geometry as that which has no parts. Proclus, in the
Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements, held that the point is
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without parts because it is the closest of all things in matter, or the Unlimited, to the One or the Limit, that which precedes all things in unity and simplicity, as described by Plotinus. The point is without parts in the same way
that the soul and the Intellectual Principle, or Nous, the divine intellect, are
without parts. Material forms that are more uniform and concentrated, without a plurality of parts, are closer to the origin of matter, closer to the Limit,
in the same way that the point in perspectival construction is at the origin of
the lines of construction in space, the rays from the eye that determine the
boundaries of objects. The point in the eye in Alberti’s cone of vision corresponds to the origin of all things, the One, as it is located among the intelligibles in the mind.
Following the definition of the point in De prospectiva pingendi, Piero
defined the line as an extension from one point to another. The line plays a
particularly important role in vision, the virtue of which is found in the point
and the lines which depart from the point to the extremities of an object. The
lines departing from the extremities of things and terminating in the eye, or
the point, form the angle under which the thing is represented. These characteristics of the line follow the definitions of the line given by Euclid in the
Elements of Geometry: a line is length without breadth; the limits of a line
are points; lines are the limits of a surface; and a figure is that which is contained by boundaries.
In the Enneads IV.7.6, Plotinus distinguishes between perception and
what might be called apperception, or multiple perceptions. Actual perceptual experience is multiple and diversified; perceived objects have no necessary connections in size or position, and can be perceived in a variety of
ways by the different senses. But in human perception all objects and acts of
perception are unified to form a coherent whole which structures the world
around us. When the fragmented and variable objects of perception “reach
the ruling principle they will become like partless thoughts…”; they are organized in a conceptual process. Perception entails the intersection of the
immediately perceived image, the percipi or imago in psychoanalytic terms,
with a conceptual process, which involves what might be called a priori concepts, in Kantian terms, and concepts which are activated by sensory activity.
The possibility of the a priori concept in Plotinus’ model of perception is
suggested by Mike Wagner in his dissertation, Concepts and Causes: The
Structure of Plotinus’ Universe. According to Kant, in the Critique of Pure
Reason, space and time are conceptual structures which do not exist in the
real world, or are not given by the senses. The nature and existence of the
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world around us outside of our ordering of it in the structures of space and
time is unknowable to us. We can only know the world as our own geometrically constructed version of it, as our representation of it to ourselves. Perspectival construction, as defined by Alberti and Piero, constitutes the world
as we can know it as a representation of it to ourselves in abstract and minimal, universal terms.
Plotinus describes perception as a dialectic of the universal and particular, to put it in Hegelian terms. The perceived object is both whole and divided into parts. In the process of perception “there will come to be an infinity
of perceptions for each observer regarding the sense object, like an infinite
number of images of the same thing in our ruling principle.” It is the conceptual process which structures the infinite subdivision of perception, as in the
explicatum of Nicolas Cusanus; the unity of perceptual experience is inaccessible, as is the vanishing point of perspective in relation to the lines of
emanation, or the unity of the One in the point. Plotinus suggests what
Jacques Lacan confirms in the twentieth century; we are inherently fragmented beings in our representation of the world to ourselves in perception
as a function of our conceptual processes. We are caught in a perpetual cycle
of desire to overcome our own fragmentation, which manifests itself in the
concept of the metaphysic. Perspectival construction represents the dialectic
of the inescapable fragmented and multiple nature of perception and the metaphysical unity towards which desire leads us; perspectival construction is
thus a graph of desire, for our own unattainable unity, and for the real existence of the world around us beyond our representation of it to ourselves.
For Plotinus, perception is a function of this desire, and a mechanism of
the conceptual process, and memory in particular. He asks, “does our rememberance of the things we desired accompany our power of desiring…?”
(IV.3.28). The conceptual process is composed of the perceived object, desire, and memory. “On this assumption the desiring power is moved by what
it enjoyed when it sees the desired object again, obviously by means of the
memory. For why should it not be moved when something else is seen, or
seen in a different way?” Thought in Plotinus, as a kind of Hegelian picturethinking, is composed of mnemic residues of perceived objects, what Plotinus calls “imprints” in “recollections.” In V.3.2, “as for the things which
came to it [that is, soul] from Intellect, it observes what one might call their
imprints…and it continues to acquire understanding as if by recognizing the
new and recently arrived impressions and fitting them to those which have
long been within it: this process is what we should call the ‘recollections’ of
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the soul.” Our thoughts are propelled by the desire created by the multiple
and fragmented images of perception, by the desire to reconnect the mnemic
residues of images given by the senses in our minds to the world around us.
As Plotinus describes it, “the reasoning power in soul makes its judgment,
derived from the mental images present to it which come from senseperception, but combining and dividing them…”
The desire is always thwarted because of the barrier put up by our a prior
conceptual structuring of the world, so the desire is perpetual and never satiated. The mnemic residue would be defined by Sigmund Freud as the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, the representation of the representation, as derived
from Hegel; and the mnemic residue is at the core of the Plotinian concept of
the Intellectual Principle, or Nous, that which is other than discursive reason
in mind. Renaissance perspectival construction is generally seen by twentieth-century scholars as being a limited and prohibitive form of representation
in art because it does not allow for the uninhibited role of the imago or the
mnemic residue, as in dreams, to exist outside of discursive reason. Perspectival construction posits discursive reason as an absolute regulator of perceptual experience, because the metaphysical is only accessible through logic.
This is the legacy of the Renaissance.
Plotinus does not deny that what we perceive in the world around us is
actually there, as George Berkeley might, but he suggests that things appear
to us as they are modified by our perception; ultimately we see the form of
the thing, but not the thing itself. A perceived object is only known to us as a
mental perception, and a mental perception is only known to us as a memory;
the production of the mental perception in memory constitutes cognition as
an “image-making power,” as in Hegelian picture-thinking. In Enneads
IV.3.29, “nothing will prevent a perception from being a mental image for
that which is going to remember it, and the memory and the retention of the
object from belonging to the image-making power…” Through this process,
perception as a form of cognition arrives at a conclusion, as the perception of
the form of the image is absorbed into a cognitive process, and the fragmented and multiple apperception is transformed into perception, which involves
the superimposition of a conceptual structure onto the perceived world, as in
perspectival construction. “If then the image of what is absent is already present in this, it is already remembering, even if the presence is only for a short
time.” The mnemic image replaces the perceived image which replaces the
thing, exactly as in Freud’s Vorstellungsrepräsentanz.
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Given that we can only know the world around us as images reproduced
in cognition, we can only know the world around us as an absence. Such an
absence is represented in perspective, which precludes any other possibility
of knowing the world around us outside of our cognition of it. The absence is
present in the vanishing point, as a Negative Theology; in Platonic terms, the
essence of the world is unknowable. In Lacanian terms, the absence is the
Real, that which is inaccessible to either the Symbolic, the structures of language and perception, or the Imaginary, the immediately perceived imago,
which can only be known as it is absorbed into cognition. The Real is that
around which desire circulates; we are defined by a continual dialectic of
presence and absence, of our representations of the world to ourselves and
the unattainable source of those representations.
The vanishing point of perspectival construction in the Renaissance corresponds in architecture to the altar at the end of the nave of the church, to
the location of the transubstantiation in the Eucharist, to the point at which
the material world, or our representation of it to ourselves, becomes immaterial, and inaccessible. The system of perspective, as developed by Filippo
Brunelleschi for the design of the basilica church, entailed this symbolic aspect. In a painting such as Leonardo da Vinci’s Last Supper in the refectory
of the Church of Santa Maria della Grazie in Milan, the vanishing point of
the perspective corresponds to a void through a painted window in the center
which corresponds to the location of the figure of Christ as the material manifestation of the immaterial. The receding lines which construct the illusionistic space from the vanishing point also continue beyond the picture plane to
construct the space of the refectory itself. We not only perceive this illusionistic space, but we inhabit it, and we are drawn through it to the point at
which it fails to exist outside out own perception and cognition. In Baroque
representation, the regular geometry of the emanation of the illusionistic
world is replaced by irregular tumult and chaos in relation to the ineffable
vanishing point, as in the Assumption of the Virgin in the Cathedral of Parma
by Antonio Correggio, for example. In the Baroque it is no longer possible to
approach the point at which reason fails through reason itself, because reason
itself, or reason in perception, is seen as fragmented and multiple and inadequate, corresponding to the model of Plotinus.
According to Plotinus, in IV.3.30, “The intellectual act is without parts
and has not, so to speak, come out into the open, but remains unobserved
within, but the verbal expression unfolds its content and brings it out of the
intellectual act into the image-making power, and so shows the intellectual
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act as if in a mirror, and this is how there is apprehension and persistence and
memory of it.” Beyond language and perception the intellectual act is inaccessible to us, except as a reflection in hindsight. Beyond the scaffolding of
our thoughts and perceptions, we are inaccessible to ourselves, as in psychoanalysis the unconscious is inaccessible to conscious thought except through
the fragments of dream images, according to Freud, or the fragments of linguistic functions, according to Lacan. For Lacan, meaning in language only
exists as a reflection in hindsight after the speech-act has taken place. What
lies behind our own thoughts is only accessible to us as fragmented and diversified mnemic images in picture-thinking, which constitute a reality as ordered by the vanishing lines in perspective. The vanishing point is that point
at which we can see behind the mirror, and we can see that there is nothing
there.
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